This verdict had nothing to do with the actual evidence. It's all about la faccia, face. They had to convict her. Now, with the conviction, everyone has saved face, the judiciary, the prosecutors and police have been vindicated. There will be an appeal and she will be acquitted, and that will be done to satisfy the Americans. Then everybody will be happy. Of course, Amanda and Raffaele will be in prison for another two years, but that's a small matter compared to the careers of so many important people.
That was the prescient opinion of one 'highly-connected' Italian, quoted by US writer Douglas Preston, nearly two years ago.
I don't have much sympathy for the men who burned copies of the Koran in a pub car park in Gateshead, and I suspect they weren’t motivated by high-minded rationalist scepticism. But the fact that they were arrested for their actions worries me. Still more concerning is the fact that the charge was inciting racial hatred. As I’ve grown weary of saying, Islam is a religion, not a ‘race’, and to conflate the two is to play into the hands of militants and fundamentalists who seek to shut down criticism of their faith.
As in a number of recent cases involving supposed religious ‘offence’, it looks like the authorities didn’t like what was going on, were worried about what it might lead to,and then cast around for a law which roughly fitted the ‘crime’.The religious hatred laws seemed not to cover this kind of eventuality, so why not try the race hatred laws instead?
As for the argument that to burn a book was deliberately to ‘incite’ hatred or violence, we’ve been herebefore, I think. The best response to this I’ve read was from Kenan Malik, in a comment on this post:
I agree that Qur’an burners are mindless idiots. I disagree that it would have been OK for them to have been arrested for ‘incitement’, even had they done it front of a mosque. There are two notions of incitement that all too often get conflated. The first is incitement in the sense of directly persuading others to commit violence. The second is incitement in the sense of causing offence that provokes others to be violent. Incitement in the first sense should be illegal. Incitement in the second sense should not.
It is incitement in the second sense that has been one of the prime drivers behind censorship in recent years – people being prevented from doing something because it might cause offence and hence provoke others into violence. Think of the debates around Bezhti or Fitna or The Jewel of Medina.
Take Wilders. He is a reactionary idiot and Fitna a crude anti-Muslim film designed to provoke. That is immaterial. He was originally banned from Britain because, in the government’s words, his ‘statements about Muslims and their beliefs… would threaten community harmony and therefore public security in the UK.’ But Wilders was a threat to public security only insofar as some of his critics may have been provoked enough to respond with violence. But then they, not Wilders, should have been held responsible. It would have been neither logical nor just to have penalized Wilders not for his actions but for actions others may have taken against him.
Remember that many held Salman Rushdie responsible for the violence that followed the publication of The Satanic Verses because he ‘must have known the offence it would cause’. Indeed Matthew Taylor made the very argument when I gave a talk last year at the RSA. Most of us would say that it is immaterial whether or not Rushdie knew the offence he would cause. Those who caused the violence, and only they, were responsible for that violence, however provoked they might have felt. The same goes for any violence that might follow the showing of Fitna or the burning of the Qur’an.
Burning the Qur’an in front of a mosque is clearly close to the line. Its intention would obviously be simply to provoke, and one could argue that it is similar to shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre. There is, however, a difference. Shouting ‘fire’ in a theatre when there is no fire is to induce people to take a certain action (to rush for the exit) that is rational, inevitable but will cause mayhem. The theatre goers are not responsible for the mayhem, the person who shouted ‘fire’ is. Burning a Qur’an in front of a mosque will undoubtedly provoke a response from believers. But in this case the believers have a choice in how they react, and so are responsible if they respond in a violent way. Even in this case, in other words, it is vital that we keep distinct the two different notions of incitement.
Mind you, we should be grateful to the masked goons in Gateshead for raising some interesting philosophical and theological questions. There was a brief flutter of debate on Twitter, for example, about whether burning an English translation of the Koran (as seems to have happened in this case) was as sacrilegious as destroying one in the original Arabic. If, as Muslims believe, the Koran is sacred because it contains the actual, directly-dictated words of God, then maybe versions in other languages are somehow less inspired? Doesn’t the fact that Muslims pray in Arabic confirm this literalism?
Another Twitterer wondered if deleting a copy of the Koran from his Kindle would be as offensive as burning a printed version, and whether it would similarly count as a criminal offence. Obviously a joke, but one that again raises questions about what counts as ‘sacred’, and which points up the absurdity of religious literalism and fundamentalism.
Well done Peter Tatchell, for sticking up for the Christian street preacher fined for 'homophobic remarks’ that were ‘aggravated by religious prejudice’. The perhaps unfortunately named Shawn Holes, an American Baptist evangelist touring Britain, was arrested for telling passers-by in Glasgow city centre that homosexuals deserved the 'wrath of God' and would go to hell.
As Peter says, however distasteful Mr. Holes' beliefs: 'The price of freedom of speech is that we sometimes have to put up with opinions that are objectionable and offensive.' He adds:
Just as people should have the right to criticise religion, people of faith should have the right to criticise homosexuality. Only incitements to violence should be illegal.
Quite. If we're going to start prosecuting people for expressing views that some find offensive, where will it end? The same law that's used to prevent fundamentalists articulating their hostility to homosexuality, abortion, etc, could just as easily be used by religious groups to stop secularists publicly criticising religion. We have to maintain the distinction (as I argued here) between legitimate criticism of ideas and stirring up hatred. Mr. Holes wasn't inciting the crowd to attack gays: he was happy to leave that to the judgement of what atheists would call his Imaginary Friend.
I suppose my only caveat, and where I might depart from the Tatchell line, is that I do have qualms about allowing unrestricted hellfire preaching in public places. I wouldn't prosecute preachers for expressing their personal prejudices, but I might restrict their activities on the grounds of disturbing public order. As I argued here, there's a sense in which the fundamentalist screaming damnation in the shopping centre is restricting my right to go about my business in peace. If we tolerate the Strict Brethren reminding us of our sins as we sip our lattes outside Starbucks, why not allow Islamist hate-preachers to vent their wrath in the public square?
Incidentally, one does wonder what's got into the police these days. First they take action against a legitimate TV documentary, then they harrass an innocent blogger and pay a visit to a Tory MP, now they arrest a Baptist preacher, all in the name of preventing 'religious prejudice'. Is Plod compensating for its own former reputation for racism and homophobia with this kind of over-reaction? Or is it the case that, when it comes to the difficult and sensitive issue of hate crimes, many officers just don't have the flexibility, judgement - dare I say intelligence? - to interpret the law in anything other than this hamfisted way?
I'm working up to a proper post on religion, secularism and the law, but I'm pushed for time right now and just wanted to splurge a few thoughts on the subject while they're at the forefront of my mind. I haven't even got time to find all the links but the people I refer to will know who I mean.
The occasion for my first ever post on this blog was my disappointment at finding a religious commentator whose work I liked, and who I had thought a reasonable and thoughtful person, using the label 'aggressive secularism' in what I considered a lazy and unthinking way. Nearly three years later, I had the same feeling last Friday, when I came across an editorial in the supposedly liberal Catholic weekly The Tablet (you should see how much conservative Catholic bloggers despise it) describing the National Secular Society as 'aggressively secularist' because of its response to the Pope's attack on Britain's equality legislation.
It occurred to me that the linking of 'aggressive' and 'secularism' by religionists has become one of those predictable combinations, rather like the pairing of 'militant' with 'feminist' or 'homosexual' a couple of decades ago. It has the same effect - of closing down any possibility of dialogue, since the individual or group thus labelled is viewed as motivated by anger and hostility rather than having cogent arguments worth debating. And it springs from the same sense of resentment, implying that secularists (or feminists, or gays) are to be tolerated, as long as they don't make a fuss about it. The same kind of rationale underlies the denigration of Dawkins, Hitchens, et al., as 'new atheists'. The implication is that the old atheists were all right, since they kept quiet and didn't raise awkward questions, whether about scriptural inconsistencies or the challenge posed to religion by modern science, that upset the status quo.
As to the issue under discussion in the Tablet editorial, it's obviously not a straightforward one. I'm a keen supporter of gender and sexual equality, but I'm not sure the state should get involved in determining who the Church ordains. On the other hand, I don't think anyone is suggesting that (as one Catholic blogger put it) the government is about to impose 'priestesses' on Catholics (though the sense of horror behind the use of that word tells you a great deal about the gender and sexual hang-ups of many opponents of women's ordination). And I think the Pope is playing a dangerous game, not only intervening in political debates in a sovereign nation, but also choosing this issue on which to pick a fight. Does the Church really want to cast itself as the enemy of equality and the supporter of discrimination and exclusion?
The other religion vs secularism issue that's been causing a lot of froth in the comment columns and on the blogs lately is Cherie Blair's decision, as a judge, to be lenient to an offender because he had shown himself to be a 'religious' man. Secularists are up in arms, while some religious commentators have (absurdly) seen this reaction as a threat to religious freedom. I happen to think Cherie Blair was wrong to do what she did - or at least to give the reason that she gave (I have no objection to judges using their discretion and demonstrating leniency, if appropriate). As critics of her judgement have noted, religious affiliation should not be privileged above other beliefs in such cases. How would we feel if a judge let someone off the hook on the grounds that he was a 'good socialist' or a 'good Conservative'? The privilege afforded to religious belief in this case appears to arise from a sense that being religious somehow equates to being 'good', and that faith inspires good works. But as recent history has shown - whether we're talking about Islamist or Francoist terrorism - the exact opposite is often the case.
I suspect Cherie was indulging in a bit of spurious multi-faithism - she's a Catholic, and the accused was a Muslim - and making some kind of point about how Islam can be a force for good, etc etc. But the courts are no place for such superficial and misjudged exercises in 'social cohesion', which, though apparently trivial, undermine the already fragile separation of church and state which is the basis of true religious freedom.
Oh, and then there was the Archbishop of Canterbury saying that Tony Blair was 'weak on irony' and hadn't done enough soul-searching. This, from the man who thinks sharia law would be good for Britain. I mean, come on...
Splurge over.
A propos of the Cherie case, this from Mr Bowie seems appropriate:
I've just added the 'Keep libel laws out of science' button to the bottom of this page. See here for the original story about the British Chiropractic Association's legal moves to silence science writer Simon Singh's challenge to claims about the efficacy of their treatments. And go to the Sense about Science site for more information on the campaign to defend Singh. I'm not a scientist, but this looks like a clear case of academic and intellectual freedom under attack. It also makes a mockery of the UK's antiquated and illiberal libel laws.
Give your support to this new campaign which 'calls on the UK government to recognise that Sharia law is abitrary and discriminatory and for an end to Sharia courts and all religious tribunals on the basis that they work against and not for equality and human rights'.
Even in civil matters, Sharia law is discriminatory, unfair and unjust, particularly against women and children. Moreover, its voluntary nature is a sham; many women will be pressured into going to these courts and abiding by their decisions. These courts are a quick and cheap route to injustice and do nothing to promote minority rights and social cohesion. Public interest, particularly with regard to women and children, requires an end to Sharia and all other faith-based courts and tribunals.
A 44-year-old Salford man, Syed Mustafa Zaidi, has been convicted of child cruelty after forcing two teenage boys to beat themselves with a curved blade whip, as part of a Shia Muslim ritual. According to the BBC report:
The 14-year-old boy, who was 13 at the time, said Zaidi told them both: "Start doing it, start doing it." The child told the court: "We said 'we don't want to do it'." He said he saw Zaidi flogging himself before washing blood from the whip and handing it to the 15-year-old boy. He said Zaidi was "pulling him and pushing him", telling him to "keep doing it" and telling people "this is a sad moment and look he's not doing it'. The boy said Zaidi continued to pressure the older teenager to whip himself. He said the 15-year-old boy "swung it once or twice and said 'I don't want to do it anymore'."
As a result of their participation in the ritual, the boys sustained 'multiple lacerations' to their backs, with 'several deeper cuts'.
Despite the horrific details of the case, I confess to feeling a twinge of sympathy for Mr. Zaidi, an otherwise law-abiding man who seems to have had no idea that he was doing anything illegal, and who claimed as his defence: 'This is a part of our religion'. After other recent cases in which the courts have concluded that religious belief trumps anti-discrimination legislation, not to mention common sense, why shouldn't he assume that it would also override the laws against child cruelty?
Superintendent Nadeem Butt of Greater Manchester Police is reported as saying that 'the sensitivities this case raises - both legal and cultural - are significant'. Rough translation: let's not do anything to upset the fundamentalists. Meanwhile Carol Jackson of the CPS has stated that the prosecution 'was not an attack on the practices or ceremonies of Shia Muslims'. But if those practices or ceremonies routinely involve lacerating the backs of minors - why not?
Back from a week away, I find I missed the business about the Sikh schoolgirl and her bangle, which has some similarities with thesecases. I see Shuggy and Norm have been having a bit of a to-do about the issues raised. For me, Nick Cohen's piece in yesterday's Observer offered the best take on the affair. Like Cohen, my initial reaction was that the court case could easily have been avoided:
It was a trivial case, which made you wonder about the dogmatism of both sides and the quality of the lawyers. The school could have given way - the bracelet was little more than a slim band. Watkins-Singh's parents could have accepted that they had a duty to uphold the authority of the teachers.
But I also agree with him that the judge's ruling in this case, as in the recent case of the anti-gay Christian registrar, established the worrying precedent that religious belief offers a unique get-out clause from laws that should apply equally to all. The judge in this case should have ruled that all girls at the school had a right to wear bracelets, not just Sikh girls. And referring to the registry office case, Cohen observes: 'The court offers no protection to workers who have no religious reasons for their homophobia.'
As I noted in relation to the registrar's case, and the story about the headscarf-wearing would-be hairdresser, employers are under no obligation to placate, nor the state to compensate, believers who deliberately choose jobs that conflict with their beliefs. As Cohen says:
If Ms Ladele thought homosexuality sinful, she should not have wanted to work for an institution that organised 'gay weddings'. The same objections applied to the Muslim checkout staff at Sainsbury's who refused to scan alcohol. If the sale of alcohol was as offensive to their religious principles as they claimed, they would no more want to work for a company that sold wine than a pacifist would want to join the SAS.
And Cohen concludes that this rash of religious grievance cases provides a powerful argument for a secular society:
The way out of the mess is for the state to commit itself to secularism; to offer full religious freedom, while striving to keep religion out of the public sphere. Leaving all considerations of principle aside, secularism is the only ideology that can make a multifaith society work. The alternative is a future of competitive religious grievance and unremitting vexatious litigation.
